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Sincerity in Simple and Complex Voting Mechanisms
Abstract
We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alter-
natives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus dene
sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish.
When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type (simple voting mecha-
nisms) we show that eliminating some conditions for strategic voting, individuals
optimal behavior coincides with an intuitive and common denition of sincerity.
In order to obtain a precise denition of sincerity in voting mechanisms allow-
ing for multiple message types (complex voting mechanisms) further restrictions
on strategic voting are required. We illustrate our methodological approach using
approval voting (AV) as a prime example of complex voting mechanisms for which
no conclusive denition of sincerity exists in the literature.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we discuss we discuss a new approach to dening sincerity in voting mechanisms.
A denition of sincerity is important since it allows to compare the properties of di¤erent
voting rules with respect to votersstrategic behavior. Under di¤erent voting mechanisms,
and given voterspreferences over alternatives, voters may be better able to favour the election
of preferred outcomes by behaving strategically instead of sincerely and thus, manipulate the
voting mechanism.1 In order to provide a general denition of sincerity, our approach is to
consider this strategic component of voting and eliminate it.
There exists ample literature on the denition of sincerity for di¤erent voting mechanisms
and on which voting rules may achieve it.2 Brams and Fishburn (1978) dene sincere voting
as non-strategic behavior in which individuals vote directly in accordance with their prefer-
ences. The problem arises because translating preferences over alternatives to sincere votes
may not be direct under some voting rules, since they may demand to structure votes in a
di¤erent format than preferences may be specied.
Since the majority of the voting literature limits the analysis to ordinal preferences over
alternatives, votes are normally structured in the same format as preferences and thus, this
problem has not been highlighted.3 However, it seems plausible to assume that voters may be
able to quantify di¤erences between alternatives and thus, they may have cardinal preferences
over them. Under cardinal preferences, if a voting mechanism exactly required all cardinal
information, the denition of sincere votingwould be straightforward. A sincere vote
would just be the declaration of the cardinal utility that each alternative gives to a voter.
Consider the following example. There are three alternatives x; y and z that yield the
following utilities to a voter: U(x) = 0:8; U(y) = 0:5 and U(z) = 0:1. A voting rule that
required all cardinal information would have associated as sincere votingthe revelation of
utilities 0:8; 0:5 and 0:1 respectively.
However, the majority of voting mechanisms only require (partial) ordinal information
1Any voting rule is subject to strategic voting behaviour when its range has at least three
alternatives and there are no dictators (Gibbard (1973), Satterwhaite (1975).
2Starting with Farquharson (1969).
3See, for example, Arrow (1951), Fishburn (1973) and Nurmi (1987).
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from voters and thus a denition of sincerity may be more complicated. Votes may be
understood as messages since they transmit information on the desirability of the alternatives
for the voters. The translation of cardinal utilities to non-cardinal votes may then depend
on the number (and type) of messages each voting mechanism allows.
If the voting mechanism only allows for one possible message type (simple voting mecha-
nism) then identifying sincere behavior is not so problematic. A sincere vote would be the one
that intuitively best representsthe order of the cardinal preferences, given the restrictions
of the voting mechanism. For example, the plurality rule is a clear case of a voting rule that
allows for only one message type, since voters can only choose between singletons (with the
meaning of a superior alternative, since the aggregation process will consider positively such
singletons). Thus, sincere voting under Plurality Rule (PR) would intuitively t with voting
(in the top set) for the alternative that yields highest utility to the voter. In our example, a
sincere voter under PR would then declare her real preferences by voting for alternative fxg.
Intuitively, any other possible message, for example, fzg would be a worse representation of
the voters real cardinal preferences and thus, would not be sincere.
There are however several voting rules that allow for more than one message type (complex
voting mechanisms). In such cases, there exists ambiguity about what the best representa-
tion of cardinal preferences would be. Consider Approval Voting (AV) as an example of
complex voting rules. Under AV the decision of whether to include an alternative among the
approvedones or not may naturally depend on the di¤erence in cardinal utility between
alternatives: if the voter was only allowed to approve her best alternative(to choose from
the set of singletons of 2fx;y;zg) then voting fxg would intuitively be sincere as previously
mentioned. On the other hand, if the voter was only allowed to vote for pairs of alternatives
(which is what Negative Voting would do), then voting fx; yg would be sincere as it best ts
with her cardinal preferences given the restrictions. However, as AV allows voters to specify
any subset of alternatives as the set of approved options, it may not be clear whether voting
fxg or fx; yg is the sincere message, if at all.
We use a new approach to obtain precise denitions of sincere voting behavior for simple
and complex voting mechanisms. We consider a voter under a hypothetical situation in which
conditions to behave strategically are diminished and dene sincerity as her optimal voting
strategy under such conditions.
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Strategic voting implies balancing the relative preference for the di¤erent alternatives
against the relative likelihood of inuencing the outcome of the election.4 Notice that whether
a voter assesses that her vote may a¤ect the outcome depends on how she thinks other voters
will vote. Strategic behavior may thus be enhanced the more information voters have on the
strategies of other voters. Weber (1978) and Merrill and Nagel (1987) go as far as claiming
that in settings where voters have little access to information concerning either the preferences
of other voters or their intended behavior, voters can be presumed to vote sincerely, since the
lack of information means there is no basis for voting in some clever strategic way. Our
rst two results formally study this claim. Theorem 1 shows that Webers (1978) intuition is
correct for the class of voting mechanism which we dene as simple. We show that in simple
voting mechanisms the optimal strategy of a voter with no information on other voters
strategies is unique and independent of the size of the electorate. We thus dene sincere
voting behavior as this optimal strategy for voting rules that allow for only one message
type.
However, our theorem 2 shows that the previous result cannot be directly extended to
complex voting mechanisms. We show that in complex voting mechanisms the optimal strat-
egy for any voter when information on othersstrategies is eliminated may not be unique.
For example, it may depend on other conditions that facilitate strategic behavior, such as the
size of the electorate. Thus, it cannot be the case that we consider this optimal behavior as
a precise denition of sincerity, since how sincere a vote is should not vary with the number
of voters.
We thus consider new conditions that may diminish strategic behavior. A natural intuition
emerging from the example used to prove Theorem 2 is that the larger the electorate the lower
the manipulative e¤ect of a strategic vote on the outcome of the election may be. Therefore,
following our approach, we dene sincere voting as the optimal strategy when i) there is no
information on other voterspreferences over alternatives and, ii) the size of the electorate
tends to innity.
Finally, we check this denition of sincerity for a particular example of complex voting
mechanisms: Approval Voting (AV). Theorem 3 shows that the optimal strategy under these
conditions coincides with an ad-hoc denition of sincerity in AV previously discussed in the
4See Fisher and Myatt (2002).
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literature. This denition considers sincereto approve all alternatives that yield (cardinal)
utility above the average of the utilities. Our result thus provides new support to this intuitive
denition as a consequence of eliminating those features of the problem that generate strategic
behavior.
We have focused on the case of three alternatives x; y and z: Although this case is of course
special, it is the simplest one allowing to di¤erentiate between voting rules while maintaining
conditions for strategic voting to appear.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the notation and the basic
assumptions made. Section 3 discusses a rst denition of sincerity when information on
voterspreferences is eliminated and its validity for simple and complex voting mechanisms
(Theorems 1 and 2). In Section 4 we present a second denition of sincerity by imposing
additional requirements and we use it to describe sincerity in Approval Voting (Theorem 3).
Section 5 concludes.
2 Notation and Denitions
Consider a set of n agents f1; 2; :::; ng and a set of three alternatives X = fx; y; zg: Individuals
are endowed with cardinal utilities over alternatives U = (Uj(k)) with j 2 f1; 2; :::; ng;
k 2 X and Uj(k) 2 [0; 1]. For the elegance of the exposition, assume that there are not two
alternatives providing the same utility to each agent.6
In general, every voting system does not allow voters to make explicit their utility over
alternatives. Each voting mechanism has an associated codied method of communicating
such utilities, which restricts and standardizes the information that voters can transmit.
Assume there exists a set of messages M from which each agent has to choose one. Such
message is the agents vote and transmits information on her preferences. In this paper we
consider sets of messages M containing either linear orders over X or subsets of X:7
Consider any bijective mapping  : X ! X. Given a message m 2 M , with m being a
5See Myerson and Weber (1993), Myerson (2002) and Dhillon and Lockwood (2004).
6Parallel results are obtained without such assumption, although proofs become tedious
without adding further insights.
7Messages on linear orders or subsets of alternatives are the most common approach to
voting.
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linear order, then (m) is a linear order such that: x (m)y , (x) m (y): Given a message
m 2 M , with m being a subset of alternatives m = fx1; :::; xtg; then (m) denotes a subset
of alternatives such that: (m) = f(x1); :::; (xt)g: We say that two messages m and m0
belong to the same message type if there exists a bijective mapping  : X ! X such that
m0 = (m). We now impose an additional condition on the valid sets of messages in order
to avoid voting mechanisms to be biased towards alternatives: if the set of possible messages
M contains a message m then it also contains any other message of the form (m), i.e.,
m 2M; : X ! X a bijective mapping =) (m) 2M . The class of messages which belong
to the same message type as m is denoted by [m]:
A voting mechanism V : Mn ! 2fx;y;zg can be dened as the composition of a set of
messages (among which the voters can choose one) and an aggregation process of the collected
messages such that some alternatives are chosen.8 We refer to elements of Mn as m =
(m1; :::;mn) with mj 2 M for j = 1; :::; n: We naturally denote (m) = ((m1); :::; (mn)):
Finally, we denote, as usual, m j = (m1; :::;mj 1;mj+1; :::;mn):
A voting mechanism may allow a set of possible messages with several message types.
We rst classify voting mechanisms according to the number of message types associated to
them. The crucial property to study sincerity will be whether voting mechanisms have a
single or several message types associated to them.
Denition 1 A voting mechanism is said to be simple if it only allows for one message type:
Otherwise, it is said to be complex.
Two examples of simple voting mechanisms are the Borda Rule and the Plurality Rule.
In the former, the set of possible messages contains all linear orders over alternatives while
in the latter, the set of possible messages contains all singletons, i.e., M = ffxg; fyg; fzgg:
A prime example of a complex voting mechanism is Approval Voting. We will formally
dene it below as we will discuss it thoroughly in the following.
Once we have discussed messages, we now briey refer to the aggregation process. In
particular, we now dene some properties on how voting mechanisms may aggregate messages
to select alternatives.
8Merril and Nagel (1987) also di¤erentiate between balloting methods and the decision
rules that produce an outcome.
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Denition 2 A voting mechanism V is Neutral in alternatives if for any permutation  of
the set of alternatives and any m in Mn; then V ((m)) =  (V (m)) :
Neutrality in alternatives implies that the names of the alternatives do not a¤ect their
election.
Our second denition refers to the monotonicity of the aggregation process. We distin-
guish between voting mechanisms composed by linear orders or subsets as messages.
Denition 3 A voting mechanism V with M containing linear orders (respectively subsets
of alternatives) is weakly monotonic if for any alternative x; for all y; z 2 Xnfxg; for all j 2
f1; :::; ng and for any pair of messagescollections m and m0 with y mj z () y m0j z and x
mj y =) x m0j y; (respectively y 2 m() y 2 m0 and x 2 mj =) x 2 m0j) , then:
x 2 V (m) =) x 2 V (m0) ;
fxg = V (m) =) fxg = V (m0) :
Our monotonicity condition is mild. It just implies that if an agents message is modied
such that it favours an alternative x, the voting mechanism responds accordingly. Thus, if
x was in the elected set before modifying agents message in a particular way, then it is also
elected under the new message. Similarly, if x is the only elected alternative then it must
also be the only elected alternative under the new message.
Finally, we dene Approval Voting, which is an example of a voting rule that satises
Neutrality in alternatives and Monotonicity. We will use it in sections 3 and 4.
Denition 4 A voting mechanism V is Approval Voting if M = 2fx;y;zg and the selected
alternatives are those that maximize the number of messages in which they appear. 9
Using the above denitions, our goal is to dene sincere voting behavior for voting mech-
anisms. We understand sincere voting behavior as opposed to strategic behavior. The latter
9In the spirit of Merril and Nagel (1987), they would claim that AV is our balloting
method, while, given our denition, the outcome of the election is decided under Plurality
Rule. Our denitions consider both characteristics of voting rules, i.e., the set of available
messages and the way to aggregate them.
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comprises the possibility of favouring the election of preferred outcomes by misrepresenting
sincere messages. There exist some conditions that may facilitate the appearance of strategic
behavior. For instance, the inuence of an individual agents message on the outcome of the
election or the amount of information agents have on otherspreferences over alternatives.
Our approach is to dene sincere voting as the optimal voting strategy when the conditions
that ease strategic behavior are diminished. Since such approach requires to study how agents
react to uncertainty, we impose the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1 In the absence of information on other agents preferences over alter-
natives, agents believe that any possible combination of othersmessages is equally probable.
Formally, for all j and for all m j 2 Mn 1; pj(m j) = ( 1]M )n 1 where pj(m j) is the
probability with which agent j beliefs other agents will transmit messages m j :
Notice that the probability each agent assigns to any combination of messages by other
agents clearly depends on the cardinality of the set of messages. In particular, for the case
of AV, 8j and for all m j 2Mn 1; pj(m j) =
 
1
2]X
n 1
:
Assumption 2 Given agentsbeliefs, they maximize their expected utility over alterna-
tives.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are a simple way for voters to resolve the uncertainty about others
preferences. Notice that we aim to strengthen conditions that eliminate strategic voting
and thus, our assumptions refer to cases in which agents can not form clear expectations
about how others will vote. Moreover, these assumptions may have a behavioral support.
Both assumptions are also the common starting point to dene k-levels of rationality in the
literature on degrees of cognitive complexity which has found certain experimental validity.10
3 Sincerity and Informational Conditions
We aim to dene sincere voting as the best response strategy when the possibility of strategic
behavior is diminished. In particular, in this section we study whether we can dene sin-
cere voting behavior as the optimal behavior when voters do not have information on other
10See Stahl (1993), Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), Costa-
Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001) and Goeree and Holt (2004).
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voterspreferences. Theorem 1 shows that when voting mechanisms are simple, eliminating
such information uniquely identies the optimal voting strategy, which we dene as sincere.
Notice that this result conrms the intuition that under simple voting mechanisms sincerity
implies transmitting pieces of ordinal information contained in agentscardinal preferences
over alternatives.
Theorem 1: Let V be a simple voting mechanism satisfying Neutrality in alternatives
and Weak Monotonicity: Assume, there is no information on agents preferences over al-
ternatives X = fx; y; zg and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for any number of agents n;
agent is best response (sincere behavior) is:
 For M = [m] with m being a linear order, the linear order such that x m y m z ,
Ui(x) > Ui(y) > Ui(z).
 For M = [m] with m being a subset of alternatives, the subset of the ]m alternatives
which provide highest utility to agent i:
Proof: We proceed to prove separately the cases in which the set of messages is the set
of linear orders and the cases in which the set of messages is a collection of subsets of X.
 We rst consider the case in whichM = flinear orders over Xg: Consider wlog. Ui(x) >
Ui(y) > Ui(z): Consider the linear order m such that x m y m z. We have to prove
that m is agent is best response independently of the number of agents in society.
We show that m is a better response than m0, where y m0 x m0 z: To see this, let us
analyze all the possible situations in which transmitting m0 could be benecial for agent i:
Consider any combination of messages by the other agents in society, m i. Then, given that
the voting mechanism is Weakly Monotonic, we know that x 2 V (m i;m0)) x 2 V (m i;m)
and y 2 V (m i;m) ) y 2 V (m i;m0). We also know that fxg = V (m i;m0) ) fxg =
V (m i;m) and fyg = V (m i;m) ) fyg = V (m i;m0): The following table species all
possible outcomes of the election in which declaring m0 instead of m may be benecial for
agent i: Any other combination of othersmessages always yields a worse outcome when
declaring m0. For instance, outcome fx; yg whenever i states m yields lower utility than
outcome fx; zg whenever i states m0, since Ui(z)+Ui(x)2 < Ui(y)+Ui(x)2 and thus declaring m0
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would not be benecial. Notice also that not every pair of outcomes can be associated to
messages m and m0: For example, the outcome fy; zg whenever i states m and outcome fx; yg
whenever i states m0 is not possible since x 2 V (m i;m0) but x =2 V (m i;m):
Messages Outcome
m fx; zg fx; y; zg fx; zg fx; zg fx; y; zg fy; zg fzg fzg
m0 fx; yg fx; yg fx; y; zg fyg fyg fyg fyg fy; zg
Cases 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)
Notice that under cases 3); 4) and 5); m0 yields higher expected utility than m only when
Ui(y) >
Ui(x)+Ui(z)
2 :
In order to prove that message m is a better response than m0, we show that, for any
of the previous cases (associated to a combination of messages by the others), there exists
another combination of messages by the others such that:
1. Its probability of occurrence is larger.
2. The benet from transmitting m instead of m0 is larger than the benet from trans-
mitting m0 instead of m in the initial case:
Consider the bijection  : X ) X, where (x) = y; (y) = x and (z) = z. For k;
k 2 f1; :::; 8g; consider the combination of othersmessagesmk i which makes transmittingm0
benecial with respect to m. Consider also the combination of othersmessages (mk i): By
Assumption 1, individual i assigns the same probability to messages (mk i) and m
k
 i: Since
(m) = m0 and (m0) = m; by Neutrality in alternatives, it must be that V
 
m;(mk i)

=

 
V
 
m0;mk i

and V
 
m0; (mk i)

= 
 
V
 
m;mk i

: Thus, we can compute parallel cases
(with equal probability) to those of the previous table. The outcomes of the voting mechanism
now are:
Messages Outcome
m fx; yg fx; yg fx; y; zg fxg fxg fxg fxg fx; zg
m0 fy; zg fx; y; zg fy; zg fy; zg fx; y; zg fx; zg fzg fzg
Cases 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)
10
For cases k; k 2 f1; :::; 8g; the benet obtained from declaring m instead of m0 is, in all
the cases, at least as large as the loss for the corresponding case k. Given that any of these
cases has the same probability as its counterpart, m guarantees a expected utility at least as
large as m0:
Showing that any other message m00 yields lower expected utility than m follows exactly
the same reasoning.11 Thus, m is agent is best response.
 We now consider situations in which M is a family of subsets of X: In order to have a
simple voting mechanism, there only exist four possibilities:
M1 = fg;M2 = fXg;M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg and M4 = ffx; yg; fx; zg; fy; zgg:
M1 and M2 are trivial cases given that agents can not decide which message to transmit.
Plurality Rule is a prime example of a voting mechanism using M3. Negative Voting (or
Antiplurality) is an example of a voting mechanism using M4:12 We here prove the result for
M3 and leave the analogous proof for M4 for the reader.
Consider M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg and wlog. Ui(x) > Ui(y) > Ui(z): We rst show that
transmitting fxg is better than transmitting fyg: Consider any combination of messages
in society, m i. Then, given that the voting mechanism is Weakly Monotonic, we now
that x 2 V (m i; fyg) ) x 2 V (m i; fxg) and y 2 V (m i; fxg) ) y 2 V (m i; fyg).
Additionally, fxg = V (m i; fyg) ) fxg = V (m i; fxg) and fyg = V (m i; fxg) ) fyg
= V (m i; fyg): The following table, which is in fact equivalent to the case of linear orders,
species all possible outcomes in which transmitting fyg may be benecial for agent i:
11Since all the proofs rely in the same construction, for simplicity we explicitly exclude
them. They are, however, available upon request.
12One is tempted to think that Negative Voting also uses M3, given that agents transmit
their least preferred alternative. However, for Negative Voting to satisfy weak monotonicity,
its messages must be interpreted as transmitting all the alternatives but the least preferred
one.
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Messages Outcome
fxg fx; yg fx; yg fx; y; zg fxg fxg fxg fxg fx; zg
fyg fy; zg fx; y; zg fy; zg fy; zg fx; y; zg fx; zg fzg fzg
Cases 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)
The analysis is parallel to the case of linear orders, but proving that fxg strictly yields a
larger expected utility than fyg: Reproducing the analysis with strategies fyg and fzg it can
be shown that fyg strictly yields a larger expected payo¤ than fzg: Thus, transmitting fxg
strictly yields a larger expected utility than fyg and fzg, concluding the proof for M3. 
We have therefore shown that our rst denition of sincerity is appropriate for simple
voting mechanisms. Votersoptimal strategy under no information conditions is to assign
votes in a manner that maintains some ordinal information of their true preferences. Notice
that in simple mechanisms this behavior does not depend on the weight of an individual
agents vote on the outcome of the election. However, Theorem 2 shows that the absence of
information is not enough to guarantee a precise denition of sincerity for complex voting
mechanisms. The reason is that best responses may depend, for instance, on the number of
agents participating in the election.
Theorem 2: There exists complex voting mechanisms for which eliminating all informa-
tion on other voters preferences does not uniquely identify an optimal voting strategy. In
particular, optimal voting may depend on the size of the electorate.
Proof: We prove it by showing that the optimal voting behavior in a particular complex
voting mechanism V varies with the size of the electorate. Let V be Approval Voting.
Under AV agents can transmit a large variety of messages. For example, in the case of three
alternatives, AV allows for the set of messages M = 2fx;y;zg: This set is composed by the
following four di¤erent message types M1 = fg; M2 = fXg; M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg and
M4 = ffx; yg; fx; zg; fy; zgg.
Assume Ui(x) > Ui(y) > Ui(z): Assume, there is no information on agentspreferences
over alternativesX = fx; y; zg and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We claim that agent i optimally
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transmits message fx; yg if and only if Ui(y)  (n)Ui(x)+(1 (n))Ui(z) with (n) 2 (0; 1).
Otherwise, agent i optimally transmits message fxg.
Let Ui(x) > Ui(y) > Ui(z): In Theorem 1, we have proved that fxg is a best response
among strategies in M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg whenever the domain of the voting rule V is M3:
Notice that using the same procedure as the proof of Theorem 1, we can indeed show that fxg
is a best response among strategies inM3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg whenever the domain of the voting
rule V is 2fx;y;zg: Given that AV satises Neutrality in alternatives andWeak Monotonicity,
we can ensure that fxg is a best response among strategies inM3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg: A similar
argument applies for M4:
Therefore, the only messages worth considering are f; X; fxg; fx; ygg: We rst show
that voting fxg is always better than voting X (respectively ): Suppose that voting X
(respectively ) leads to have S 6= fxg as the set of elected alternatives.13 If x 2 S 6= fxg, then
transmitting fxg leads to have x as the unique elected outcome, which obviously dominates
S for agent i. If x =2 S, transmitting fxg leads either to have S as the set of elected outcomes
or to have S [ fxg as the set of elected outcomes. This is clearly preferable to the outcome
obtained when transmitting X (respectively ). Thus we focus on fx; yg and fxg:We present
here the situations in which fx; yg and fxg could yield di¤erent outcomes:
Messages Outcome
fxg fxg fzg fx; yg fx; zg fy; zg fx; y; zg
fx; yg fx; yg fy; zg fyg fx; y; zg fyg fyg
Cases 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
The previous table shows all possible combinations of others agentsmessages in which
messages fx; yg and fxg yield di¤erent outcomes. In order for these situations to occur, the
distribution of other agentsmessages must satisfy the following conditions:
13Obviously if S = fxg then transmitting fxg has the same e¤ect on the election of out-
comes.
13
1) ax = ay > az   1 4) ax + 1 = ay + 1 = az
2) ax + 1 < ay + 1 = az 5) ax + 1 < ay = az
3) ax = ay   1 > az   1 6) ax + 1 = ay = az;
where ak represents the number of times alternative k appears in other agentsmessages,
excluding agent i:
 Under Assumption 1, the probabilities Pq of each of these six conditions are:
P1 =
n 1P
t=0
tP
s=0
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
s
1CCCA
(23)n 1
P2 =
n 1P
t=2
t 2P
s=0
0BBB@ n  1
s
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t  1
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
(23)n 1
P3 =
n 1P
t=1
t 1P
s=0
0BBB@ n  1
t  1
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
s
1CCCA
(23)n 1
P4 =
n 1P
t=1
0BBB@ n  1
t  1
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t  1
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
(23)n 1
P5 =
n 1P
t=2
t 2P
s=0
0BBB@ n  1
s
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
(23)n 1
P6 =
n 1P
t=1
0BBB@ n  1
t  1
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
0BBB@ n  1
t
1CCCA
(23)n 1
Hence, the expected utility of messages fxg and fx; yg under assumption 1 can be
expressed in terms of these probabilities. For message fxg, the expected utility equals:
P1Ui(x) + P2Ui(z) + P3

Ui(x) + Ui(y)
2

+ P4

Ui(x) + Ui(z)
2

+P5

Ui(y) + Ui(z)
2

+ P6

Ui(x) + Ui(y) + Ui(z)
3

whereas for message fx; yg the expected utility equals:
P1

Ui(x) + Ui(y)
2

+ P2

Ui(y) + Ui(z)
2

+ P3Ui(y) +
P4

Ui(x) + Ui(y) + Ui(z)
3

+ P5Ui(y) + P6Ui(y)
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Therefore, using Assumption 2, the condition for preferring to transmit fx; yg has to be
that it yields a higher expected value than transmitting fxg, i.e., 
P1
2 +
P3
2 +
P4
6 +
P6
3

Ui(x)+
 
P2
2 +
P4
6 +
P5
2 +
P6
3

Ui(z) 
 
P1
2 +
P2
2 +
P3
2 +
P4
3 +
P5
2 +
2P6
3

Ui(y)
Denoting:
f(n) =
 
P1
2 +
P3
2 +
P4
6 +
P6
3

g(n) =
 
P2
2 +
P4
6 +
P5
2 +
P6
3

h(n) =
 
P1
2 +
P2
2 +
P3
2 +
P4
3 +
P5
2 +
2P6
3

;
we can express the previous inequality as f(n)h(n)Ui(x) +
g(n)
h(n)Ui(z)  Ui(y). Since f(n) +
g(n) = h(n); we only need to consider the function (n) = f(n)h(n) to conclude the proof. Since
any Pq : q = 1; :::; 6 is di¤erent from zero, it follows that (n) 6= 1 and (n) 6= 0. 
Theorem 2 shows that when voting mechanisms are not simple, the result in Theorem
1 does not hold, as optimal behavior does not only depend on the available information on
candidatespreferences. In the case of ÁV, whether the alternative yielding second highest
utility to an agent is included in her transmitted message depends on its relative cardinal
utility with respect to the utilities yielded by the most and least preferred alternatives. Such
dependence rests on the weights measured by the function (n); which varies with the size
of the electorate n: For example, if U(x) = 0:9; U(y) = 0:7 and U(z) = 0:1, basic calculus
shows that an agent optimally transmits message fxg when the size of the electorate is 2:
On the other hand, the same agent transmits message fx; yg when the size of the electorate
is 3: It seems unreasonable that how sincere a voting strategy is depends on the size of the
electorate. Thus, in the following subsection we further impose conditions to diminish the
possibility of strategic voting in order to obtain sincere behavior.
4 Sincerity and the Size of the Electorate
The previous section shows that our rst denition of sincerity, although valid for a large class
of frequently used voting mechanisms, is not valid for complex voting mechanisms, as optimal
behavior does not only depend on the available information on candidatespreferences.
The inuence of an individual agents vote on the outcome of an election diminishes the
bigger the size of an electorate. Notice that in the proof for Theorem 2, we already identied
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the size of the electorate as a source of heterogeneity in optimal behavior for approval voting,
which is a particular example of a complex voting mechanism.
Following our methodological approach we consider a second denition of sincerity by
eliminating other sources of manipulability. According to our denition, sincere voting is
identied as the optimal strategy when voters do not have information on other voters
preferences and the size of the electorate tends to innity.
We nally check the applicability of this denition of sincere voting to a particular case:
Approval Voting. Previous literature has discussed at least two ad-hoc denitions of sincerity
for AV. The rst one species that if one alternative is voted in the top set (approved),
all alternatives that yield higher cardinal utility to the individual should also be included
in the top set to be considered sincere.14 Notice that this denition is somewhat weak as
several messages would then be considered sincere. For the case of three alternatives and
using the numerical example shown in the introduction, fx; y; zg (meaning all alternatives
are approved);  (meaning all alternatives are disapproved), fxg and fx; yg would all be
considered sincere under this weak denition.
Translating this argument to cardinal utilities and using our notation, we establish a
denition of weak sincerity :
Denition 5 Agent is message m is Weak Sincere under AV if for all x; y such that Ui(x) >
Ui(y); y 2 m implies x 2 m:
We refer to such denition as weak because it does not determine a unique message as
sincere, which may be an appealing property.
Corollary 6 Let V be Approval Voting. Assume, there is no information on agentsprefer-
ences over alternatives X = fx; y; zg and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then agent is optimal
behavior satises the weak denition of sincerity.
Proof. Notice that following Theorem 2, the only possible optimal messages are fxg and
fx; yg; and thus, it easily follows that the weak denition of sincerity always holds.
14See Brams and Fishburn (1981) and Niemi (1984) .
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A second and more restrictive denition identies sincerity with voting for those alterna-
tives that yield the individual more cardinal utility than the average of all alternatives.15 In
the numerical example, the only sincere voting representation would then be to vote for both
x and y (i.e. fx; yg) since both provide more cardinal utility than the average (0:8 > 0:47
and 0:5 > 0:47).
Using our notation and for the case of three alternatives, such denition can be expressed
as follows:
Denition 7 Agent is message m is Strong Sincere under AV if for all x 2 X:
x 2 m, Ui(x)  1
3
X
y2X
Ui(y):
The strong denition of sincere voting under AV implies voting for those alternatives that
yield more utility than the average of utilities. This denition, although intuitively appealing,
has not been given a complete formal justication. In particular, it has been dened under a
restrictive set of assumptions, such as imposing specic probabilities on the number of votes
each alternative receives. As in the previous subsections, we obtain our results by precisely
calculating these probabilities using a cognitive process based only on initial beliefs over
individual votes. In the remainder of the paper, we show that the best response of an agent
under conditions that diminish the possibility of behaving strategically is precisely voting for
those alternatives that yield more than the average of utilities. Therefore, we provide stronger
support for this second denition of sincerity, which uniquely determines which message is
sincere in AV.
In the proof for Theorem 2, we identied agentsbest response in AV in the absence of
information. Under such conditions, to include in the transmitted message the alternative
yielding the second highest utility partially depends on the size of the electorate through the
weighting function (n): Theorem 3 determines the limit of (n) when n goes to innity.
Theorem 3: Let V be Approval Voting. Assume there is no information on agents
15See, for instance, Weber (1978), Ho¤man (1982), Merrill (1983), Merrill and Nagel (1987)
who present some results characterizing this behavior under a very restrictive set of assump-
tions.
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preferences over alternatives X = fx; y; zg and assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then:
lim
n !1(n) =
1
2
:
Proof: Following notation introduced in the proof of Theorem 2, we want to prove that
lim
n !1(n) = limn !1
f(n)
h(n) =
1
2 : Given that
f(n) + g(n) = h(n);
this is equivalent to proving,
lim
n !1
f(n)  g(n)
h(n)
= 0:
Notice that f(n); g(n) and h(n) are functions of the probabilities of each of the six possible
races between alternatives. Substituting their values and using basic calculus, we obtain that,
f(n)  g(n)
h(n)
=
1
2(P1   P5)
h(n)
+
1
2(P3   P2)
h(n)

1
2(P1   P5)
1
2P5
+
1
2(P3   P2)
1
2P2
=
P1   P5
P5
+
P3   P2
P2
:
Hence, given the positivity of (P1   P5) and (P3   P2) (see below the combinatorial
decomposition), P1 P5P5 +
P3 P2
P2
is an upper bound for f(n) g(n)h(n) : Thus, proving
lim
n !1

P1   P5
P5
+
P3   P2
P2

= 0;
implies lim
n !1
f(n) g(n)
h(n) = 0:
Actually, we here prove that lim
n !1
P1 P5
P5
= 0 and lim
n !1
P3 P2
P2
= 0; which is stronger than
what is needed. We start by proving that lim
n !1
P1 P5
P5
= 0 . Notice that the combinatorial
expressions for P1 and P5 appear in the proof of Theorem 2.
Consider the following two standard properties of combinatorial numbers which apply to
any non-negative integers k; i for k  i :
Property 1:
0@ k
i
1A+
0@ k
i  1
1A =
0@ k + 1
i
1A :
Property 2 (symmetry):
0@ k
i
1A =
0@ k
k   i
1A :
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In order to prove lim
n !1
P1 P5
P5
= 0; we rst use Property 1.
lim
n !1
P1   P5
P5
= lim
n !1
n 1P
t=2
264
0@ n  1
t
1A2 240@ n  1
t
1A+
0@ n  1
t  1
1A35
375
n 1P
t=2
0@ n  1
t
1A2 t 2P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A
=
= lim
n !1
n 1P
t=2
264
0@ n  1
t
1A2 240@ n
t
1A35
375
n 1P
t=2
0@ n  1
t
1A2 t 2P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A
:
We only consider the cases in which n is even (a similar reasoning would follow for the
case in which n is odd). From the last expression and using Property 2 we can derive,
lim
n !1
P1   P5
P5
= lim
n !1
n 1P
t=2
264
0@ n  1
t
1A2 240@ n
t
1A35
375
n 1P
t=2
0@ n  1
t
1A2 t 2P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A
= lim
n !1
B1 +B2 +B3
C1 + C2 + C3
where,
B1 =
n 2
2P
t=2
0@ n  1
t
1A2 240@ n
t
1A+
0@ n
n  t  1
1A35,
B2 =
0@ n  1
n  2
1A20@ n
n  2
1A ;
B3 =
0@ n  1
n  1
1A20@ n
n  1
1A :
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C1 =
n 2
2P
t=2
0@ n  1
t
1A2 24t 2P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A+ n t 3P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A35 ;
C2 =
0@ n  1
n  2
1A2 n 4P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A ;
C3 =
0@ n  1
n  2
1A2 n 3P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A :
Notice that lim
n !1
B1+B2+B3
C1+C2+C3
can be expressed as lim
n!1
TP
t=1
bt(n)
TP
t=1
ct(n)
, with bt(n) and ct(n) being
products of combinatorial numbers.
Notice also that lim
n!1
TP
t=1
bt(n)
TP
t=1
ct(n)
 lim
n!1
bkn
ckn
where kn is the value that maximizes
bt(n)
ct(n)
for
dimension n: Therefore, it is su¢ cient to prove that lim
n!1
bkn
ckn
= 0.
We now identify the value kn: It is not di¢ cult to see that this value has to belong to
B1 and C1: With respect to B1; notice that by Property 2,
0@ n
n  t  1
1A =
0@ n
t+ 1
1A :
Applying Properties 1 and 2 to B1, we obtain:
B1 =
n 2
2P
t=2
0@ n  1
t
1A20@ n+ 1
t+ 1
1A :
Hence, one of the values can be expressed:
bt
ct
=
0@ n  1
t
1A20@ n+ 1
t+ 1
1A
0@ n  1
t
1A2 24t 2P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A+ n t 3P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A35
=
0@ n+ 1
t+ 1
1A
24t 2P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A+ n t 3P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A35
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and therefore,
bt+1
ct+1
=
0@ n+ 1
t+ 2
1A
24t 1P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A+ n t 4P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A35
:
Notice also that t+1  n 22 implies t+2  n2  n+12 . Thus,
0@ n+ 1
t+ 2
1A 
0@ n+ 1
t+ 1
1A :With
respect to the denominators, it is clear that
24t 2P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A+ n t 3P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A35 
24t 1P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A+ n t 4P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A35 =
0@ n  1
n  t+ 3
1A 
0@ n  1
t  1
1A :
By property 2 this is equivalent to
0@ n  1
t+ 2
1A 
0@ n  1
t  1
1A > 0; and therefore btct  bt+1ct+1 :
Therefore, the maximal value is obtained when t = n 22 .
lim
n!1
bt
ct
 lim
n!1
0@ n+ 1
n
2
1A
24n 62P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A+ n 42P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A35
:
Applying property 2 we obtain
lim
n!1
bt
ct
 lim
n!1
0@ n  1
n
2
1A
n 1P
s=0
0@ n  1
s
1A 
0@ n  1
n 2
2
1A 
0@ n  1
n
2
1A 
0@ n  1
n+2
2
1A
=
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lim
n!1
0@ n+ 1
n
2
1A
2n 1  
0@ n  1
n 2
2
1A 
0@ n  1
n
2
1A 
0@ n  1
n+2
2
1A
= 0:
The proof for lim
n!1
P3 P2
P2
= 0 is similar, and thus we omit it. This concludes the proof. 
Theorem 3 says that as the size of the electorate increases, agents best response in
AV consists in voting for those alternatives that yield more than the average of utilities.
Given that we have eliminated the possibly most important components of strategic behavior,
namely information on otherspreferences and the weight of an individual vote in determining
the outcome, we interpret such best response as sincere voting behavior under AV.
Notice that previous attempts to dene sincere behavior in AV did not di¤erentiate be-
tween the implications of Theorems 2 and 3.16 The reason is that they assumed that the
probability of a tie between the number of votes that two alternatives received was equal
to the probability of one of the alternatives surpassing the other by just one vote. As a
by-product of our Theorem 3, we have shown that such assumption only holds true in the
limit.
Thus, in this section we have suggested a possible way of complementing the restrictions
imposed in section 2 to obtain a unique denition of sincerity for complex voting mechanisms.
Finally, we have also tested its validity for the particular case of AV.
5 Discussion
Identifying sincere voting behavior under a variety of voting rules is an important starting
point in the discussion of adopting new voting mechanisms. A denition of sincerity is almost
straightforward when simple voting mechanisms are considered. However, we have seen that
under complex voting mechanisms such as Approval Voting dening sincerity is cumbersome.
We conjecture that the di¢ culty in dening sincerity arises as a consequence of the presence
of several message types in complex mechanisms.
16See for instance, Merrill (1979) and Ho¤man (1982).
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Our approach to dene sincere voting behavior consists in opposing sincere behavior to
strategic behavior. We methodologically contribute to obtain a formal denition of sincerity
by omitting the elements that facilitate strategic behavior; namely, by increasing the size
of the electorate and by eliminating information on other agentspreferences. The optimal
behavior obtained under such conditions is thus what we dene as sincere voting behavior.
Our aim in this paper has been to provide a denition of sincere voting behavior. Nev-
ertheless, this is not equivalent to identifying sincere voting from the results of an election.
Knowledge on the cardinal value that the alternatives yield to the voters is required in empiri-
cal tests of our results. An experiment controlling for such utility values may be a worthwhile
avenue to explore how individuals vote when informational conditions or the weight of their
votes are changed.
Finally, we have also contributed to the approval voting literature. Notice that following
our approach, our denition of sincerity for AV coincides with the previously provided strong
denition of sincerity. Our technical contribution consists in calculating optimal voting be-
havior by assessing explicitly the probability of each of the possible races between alternatives
that can occur instead of assuming they all have the same probability. Therefore, we have
provided stronger support to an intuitive denition of sincerity when agents have cardinal
utilities over three alternatives.
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